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NOTE

BARRING EXTRATERRITORIAL PROTECTION
FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES INTERDICTED ON
THE HIGH SEAS: SALE V. HAITIAN CENTERS

COUNCIL, INC
"'Give me your tired, your poor, [y]our huddled masses yearning to
breathe free, [t]he wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these,
the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden
door!' "'
Although this axiom is often used to describe the United States immigration policy,2 United States immigration laws have traditionally limited
the spirit of this clause. The belief that the admission of immigrants into
1. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, in 2 THE HEATH ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN

Lauter et al. eds., 1990).
2. See Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223, 223 (concerning rights of American
citizens in foreign states). This Act declared that "the right of expatriation is a natural and
inherent right of all people ...[and in] recognition of this principle this government has
freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the rights of citizenship." Id.; see Ex parte Kurth, 28 F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D. Cal.) (explaining that until 1921,
the United States immigration policy provided for "unrestricted admission for anyone who
sought its shores"), appeal dismissed, 106 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1939); S.REP. No. 256, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141,141 (asserting that one of the
oldest themes in United States history is "welcoming homeless refugees to our shores");
see also AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A
GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 6-2 (1992) (explaining that immigration into the United
States was virtually unrestricted until 1875 when Congress enacted a series of restrictive
immigration laws); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 855 (1987) (explaining
that prior to the Civil War, the United States received immigrants from all nations, in
furtherance of the principle followed by Congress that a "natural right" exists for all
"human beings to expatriate themselves"); infra note 3.
3. See, e.g., Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (enacting a law that established
quotas for immigration based on nationality); Kurth, 28 F. Supp. at 263 (listing historical
restrictions for specific groups of aliens seeking entry into the United States, including
convicts and prostitutes (1875), Chinese (1882), mentally ill and aliens likely to become
public charges (1882), contract laborers (1885), polygamists (1891), anarchists (1903), and
illiterates (1917)); see also RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 1.01 (2d ed.
1993) (describing the evolution of United States immigration law from few restrictions to
extensive qualitative restrictions, "including ethnic ones, and eventually to quantitative restrictions"); RUTH E. WASEM, ASYLUM SEEKERS: HAITIANS IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 4,
LITERATURE 28 (Paul

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 44:321

the United States exacerbates economic and social problems has brought
about restrictive United States immigration policies.4 Unfortunately,
5
these considerations have caused the United States to send refugees
back to countries where they face torture, imprisonment, or murder because of their skin color, political affiliation, or religious beliefs.6
7-8 (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, No. 93-233 EPW, 1993).
Wasem explains that the Immigration and Naturalization Service will not grant asylum if it
determines that the migrant seeks refuge in the United States for economic betterment,
rather than social or political reasons. Id. at 4. Approximately one-half of one percent of
the world's refugees apply for political asylum in the United States. Id. at 6-7.
4. LARRY M. EIG ET. AL., IMMIGRATION: ILLEGAL ENTRY AND ASYLUM ISSUES 1
(Congressional Research Service Issue Brief No. IB93095, 1993) (noting increased public
concern regarding immigration as a result of terrorist activities in the United States, such
as the Central Intelligence Agency shootings in Langley, Virginia on January 25, 1993, the
bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, and other terrorist plans aimed
at New York City); see STEEL, supra note 3, § 1.01 (suggesting that xenophobia influenced
Congress when it passed a significantly restrictive immigration act in 1917); Henkin, supra
note 2, at 855 (explaining that "unemployment, economic depression, and growing 'nativism,' racism, and xenophobia led to the" first exclusion acts); see also Dick Kirschten,
Catch-up Ball, 25 NAT'L J. 1976,1976 (1993) (reporting a United States poll that revealed a
widespread sentiment that immigrants take jobs and scholarships from United States citizens); id. at 1978 (quoting President Clinton who commented that the United States cannot
afford to assume the financial burdens of new immigrants " 'when we are not adequately
providing for the jobs, the health care and education of our own people' "); Richard L.
Berke, Politicians Discovering An Issue: Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1994, at A19
(explaining that politicians are encouraged by polls showing that many voters increasingly
are concerned about the impact of immigrants on the United States economy and culture);
Robert D. McFadden, Immigration Hurts City, New Yorkers Say in Poll, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
18, 1993, at B4 (polls show that many New Yorkers believe the trade center bombing
would not have happened if immigration controls had been tighter).
5. A refugee is defined as
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case
of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988); see United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 267,268. Article I of the Protocol incorporates by reference the meaning of "refugee" as it was defined by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees ratified in Geneva on July 28, 1951. Id. at 6225 n.I.
Thus, under Article I of the Protocol, "refugee" means any person who,
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence ... is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152.
6. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation
League in Support of Respondents at 9, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549
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The Naturalization Clause of the United States Constitution authorizes
Congress to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." 7 The

Supreme Court has held that federal power over migration is implicit in
the Constitution as an incident of sovereignty and foreign policy.' Congress, however, imposes statutory limitations on the federal power to reg-

ulate immigration to protect persons who are fleeing persecution in their
native countries.9

(1993) (No. 92-344) [hereinafter Brief of American Jewish Committee] (referring to the
story of the S.S. St. Louis). In a tragic incident in 1939, President Roosevelt denied United
States admission to hundreds of Jews who sought escape from Germany. Id. Consequently, many of those who returned to Europe became victims of Hitler's genocide of
millions of Jews in Nazi Germany in the 1940s. Id.; see also J. Michael Cavosie, Note,
Defending the Golden Door: The Persistence of Ad Hoc and Ideological Decision Making
in U.S. Refugee Law, 67 IND. L.J. 411, 423-24 (1992). Cavosie relates the story of when a
United States Coast Guard cutter denied a Lithuanian sailor's request for asylum despite
considerable evidence that he had been persecuted and feared future persecution. Id.
Upon return to his Soviet ship, he allegedly was beaten unconscious. Id.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl.
4.
8. The Supreme Court has cited various constitutional provisions as grants of power
to Congress to regulate immigration: power to limit the migration and importation of
"[s]uch Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit," U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl.1; power to declare war, id. § 7, cl.11; power to regulate foreign commerce;
id. § 7, cl.3; and power to make all necessary and proper laws, id. § 7, cl.18; see, e.g.,
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-18 (1936) (finding an inherent power of the federal government to regulate foreign affairs); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (holding that "[tlhe right to exclude or to expel all
aliens [is] . . .an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independentnation"); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (finding that the power to
exclude aliens is "an incident of sovereignty"); cf.50 U.S.C. § 21 (1988) (giving the President authority to apprehend, restrain, secure, and remove alien enemies during times of
war). Furthermore, in Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982), the Supreme Court held that
states do not have the power to burden resident aliens based on their alienage. Id. at 11.
9. See infra notes 10-15, 18-27 and accompanying text (detailing various enactments
that admit refugees, who otherwise would be persecuted in their native country, into the
United States). For definitions of persecution, see Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744, 746 (3d
Cir. 1961) (explaining that " 'persecution'" includes confinement and torture or severe
economic deprivation constituting a threat to life or freedom); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 211,222 (B.I.A. 1985) (defining" 'persecution' "as "a threat to the life or freedom of,
or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded as
offensive").
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Early refugee legislation' ° covered narrowly-defined classes of refugees 11 and provided limited relief for persons susceptible to persecution. 12 Congress first recognized the need to address the issue of refugee
immigration by enacting the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which resolved immediate refugee crises on a country-by-country basis. 3 In 1965,
Congress enacted a permanent mechanism for admitting some refugees

by providing for the admission of aliens who were fleeing persecution
from Communist or Middle Eastern countries.' 4 These acts, however,
10. See Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, § 6, 67 Stat. 400, 403 (omitted due to
termination of the issuance of immigration visas under this Act on December 31, 1956, as
provided by the Act) (providing that an alien who proves that he lawfully entered the
United States and that he cannot return to his native country because of persecution on
account of race, religion, or political opinion may, upon application for permanent residence, be granted immigrant visas); Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219 (repealed by
Act of September 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 654, 655) (amending the
Displaced Persons Act of 1948 by defining persecution and extending admission to refugees from additional countries); Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, § 2(d), 62 Stat.
1009, 1010 (repealed by Act of September 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 654,
655) (authorizing, for a limited period of time, the admission of natives of Czechoslovakia
and other European countries who "fled as a direct result of persecution or fear of persecution from [those] countr[ies]").
11. See Displaced Persons Act of 1948, § 4, 62 Stat. at 1011. This Act allowed Congress to grant permanent residence status to displaced persons residing in the United
States. Id. "Displaced persons" included persons who were "displaced from the
countr[ies] of [their] birth, or nationality, or of [their] last residence as a result of events
subsequent to the out-break of World War IF' and could not return for fear of persecution.
Id. The Act only permitted 15,000 displaced persons per session of Congress to become
permanent residents. Id.; see also Refugee Relief Act of 1953, § 4, 67 Stat. at 401 (providing immigrant visas to a specified number of refugees from each European country).
12. See Refugee Relief Act of 1953, § 4, 67 Stat. at 401 (providing admission for specified refugees); IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 56 (3d ed.
1992); WASEM, supra note 3, at 15 (explaining that since 1946, the United States admitted
2.6 million immigrants for humanitarian reasons and noting the varying trends of regions
from which refugees come). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 merely gave the
Attorney General the authority to parole aliens into the United States under emergency
conditions. KURZBAN, supra, at 56; 1 1992-93 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY "LAW
HANDBOOK 369 (R. Patrick Murphy et al. eds., 1992). The law permits an alien with 'parole' "status to be physically present within the United States for a particular reason without being detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. A paroled alien is
not legally admitted into the United States and is subject to exclusion from the United
States. Id. Thus, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 did not guarantee that an
alien would not be returned to a country where she might be persecuted. Id.; see also
STEEL, supra note 3, § 8.01(1)-(5) (listing the limited legal protections available to refugees
prior to the Refugee Act of 1980, including: conditional entry based upon various factors,
temporary withholding of deportation, and ad-hoc legislation addressing refugees from
specific countries).
13. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, § 2,62 Stat. at 1009 (offering protection to refugees
from specific European countries).
14. Act of October 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, sec. 3, § 203(a), 79 Stat. 911, 912-14
(current version codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988)) (providing for admission of refugees as
conditional entrants who could gain permanent residence with special procedures); see
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failed to provide comprehensive standards or procedures for considering
refugee claims.' 5
On November 1, 1968, the United States took a significant step in defining its refugee policy by acceding to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol).' 6 Article 33 of the Protocol
prohibits signatories from returning aliens to countries where their lives
or individual freedoms might be threatened.1 7 Congress incorporated the
humanitarian spirit of Article 33 in section 243(h)(1) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA). 8 This section gives the Attorney General
discretion to withhold the deportation of any alien within the United
States to a country where that alien would be physically persecuted on
the basis of her race, religion, or political opinion. 9
Finally, in the Refugee Act of 1980,20 Congress passed comprehensive
refugee legislation that established greater protections and benefits for
& BELL, supra note 2, at 6-4 (explaining that few refugees were admitted
under this legislation due to its limited coverage).
15. See S. REP. No. 256, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 144.
Ambassador Dick Clark explained that prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980,
United States refugee policy was "a patchwork of different programs that evolved in response to specific crises." Id.; STEEL, supra note 3, § 8.01(5) (explaining that because early
refugee acts only addressed refugee crises on an ad-hoc basis, special legislation had to be
enacted each time a refugee crisis arose in a specific country).
16. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol] (incorporating Article 33 of the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees).
17. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33, 189
U.N.T.S. 150, 176. Article 33 of the Convention provides that:
(1) No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
(2) The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security
of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that
country.
Id.
18. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988)); see Suzanne Gluck, Note, Intercepting
Refugees at Sea: An Analysis of the United States' Legal and Moral Obligations, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 865, 866 n.5 (1993) (noting that the United States confirmed its commitment
to observe the non-refoulement policy of the Protocol by enacting section 243(h) of the
INA).
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). As originally enacted, section
243(h)(1) "with[held] deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in
which ... the alien would be subject to physical persecution." § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214.
20. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 243(h)(1), 94 Stat. 102,107 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
FRAGOMEN

326-
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refugees. 21 The Refugee Act of 1980 amended section 243(h)(1) of the
INA.22 As amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, section 243(h)(1) prohibits the Attorney General from deporting or returning any person to a
country where she may be persecuted on the basis of her race, religion, or
political affiliation. 23 Before its amendment in 1980, section 243(h)(1) explicitly stated that the Attorney General could withhold the deportation
of an alien only if she is "within the United States.",24 Congress deleted
this explicit territorial restriction in the Refugee Act of 1980.25 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York addressed the issue of extraterritorial application of section 243(h)(1) in a
immicase regarding the United States policy of interdicting 26 Haitian
27
Haiti.
to
them
returning
summarily
and
grants on the high seas
21. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 2, at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 141-42 (explaining that the objectives of the Refugee Act of 1980 are to provide a nondiscriminatory
and systematic procedure for admitting refugees of special humanitarian concern to the
United States and to provide effective resettlement and absorption programs for refugees
who are admitted). The Senate Report explains that the purpose of the Refugee Act of
1980 is to give "statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns." Id. at 1,reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 141; see also Final Rule,
46 Fed. Reg. 45,116 (1981) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 108, 207, 209) (acknowledging
that the Refugee Act of 1980 establishes uniform procedures to meet "humanitarian needs
of refugees"); FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 2, at 6-5 (noting that the Refugee Act of
1980 established detailed procedures for choosing, admitting, and granting permanent resident status to refugees).
22. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 243(h), 66 Stat. at 214, amended by
Refugee Act of 1980, § 203(e), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 243(h)(1) currently provides
that "[tihe Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such
country." Id.
24. See supra note 19 (setting forth text of section 243(h)(1) prior to its amendment by
the Refugee Act of 1980).
25. Compare supra note 19 (providing the text of section 243(h)(1) before Congress
amended it by the Refugee Act of 1980) with supra note 23 (providing the text of section
243(h)(1) after its amendment).
26. "Interdiction" under the United States Alien Migration Interdiction Operation includes boarding Haitian-flagged vessels on the high seas to investigate the condition and
destination of the vessel and the status of the vessel's passengers. Haitian Council Ctrs.,
Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1030 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
27. Id. The issue of extraterritorial application has primarily arisen with respect to
Haiti because Haiti is the only foreign nation with which the United States has an interdiction agreement. See WASEM, supra note 3, at 11. Wasem explains that the Coast Guard
brings Cubans who are intercepted on the high seas to the United States without delay. Id.
But see EIG, supra note 4, at 7 (discussing the recent increase in interdiction of aliens from
the People's Republic of China and the Dominican Republic).
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Between 1972 and 1980, nearly 30,000 Haitians sailed toward Florida to
escape economic and political oppression in Haiti.28 In the spring of
1980, 125,000 Cubans were transported to the United States in the Mariel
boatlift.2 9 In an effort to limit the influx of immigrants, President Reagan
issued Executive Order No. 12,32430 in 1981, which commanded the Sec-

retary of State to enter agreements with foreign governments to prevent
illegal immigration to the United States. 31 Pursuant to this Order, the
Secretary of State entered an agreement with Haiti that permitted United
States Coast Guard officials to board Haitian vessels on the high seas to
prevent illegal transportation of Haitians to the United States. 32 The

agreement provided that Coast Guard officials would not return any passenger who would be subject to persecution in Haiti.3 3
28. See Margot Hornblower, Haitians Facing Eviction, WASH. POST, May 9, 1980, at
Al (reporting that between 15,000 and 30,000 Haitian refugees fled to Florida between
1972 and May 1980).
29. Jeffrey C. Gilbert & Steven Kass, Comment, Jean v. Nelson: A Stark Pattern of
Discrimination,36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1005, 1006-07 & n.11 (1982) (explaining that in April
of 1980, the Mariel boatlift began when boats from South Florida sailed to Cuba's Mariel
Harbor to bring Cuban refugees to the United States).
30. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1988).
31. Id.; see Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (1988) (explaining that President Reagan issued the Proclamation after determining
that uncontrolled immigration of undocumented aliens was "a serious national problem
detrimental to the interests of the United States").
32. Interdiction Agreement Between the United States of America and Haiti, Sept. 23,
1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559, 3559-60. The agreement provided that:
Upon boarding a Haitian flag vessel, in accordance with this agreement, the
authorities of the United States Government may address inquiries, examine documents and take such measures as are necessary to establish the registry, condition and destination of the vessel and the status of those on board the vessel.
When these measures suggest that an offense against United States immigration
laws or appropriate Haitian laws has been or is being committed, the Government of the Republic of Haiti consents to the detention on the high seas by the
United States Coast Guard of the vessels and persons found on board.
The Government of Haiti agrees to permit upon prior notification the return of
detained vessels and persons to a Haitian port, or if circumstances permit, the
United States Government will release such vessels and migrants on the high seas
to representatives of the Government of the Republic of Haiti.
The United States Government appreciates the assurances which it has received from the Government of the Republic of Haiti that Haitians returned to
their country and who are not traffickers will not be subject to prosecution for
illegal departure.
Id.
33. Id. at 3560. The Agreement set forth that "[ilt is understood that under these
arrangements the United States Government does not intend to return to Haiti any Haitian migrants whom the United States authorities determine to qualify for refugee status."
Id. Between 1981 and 1990, U.S. officials allowed less than one dozen of the 22,651 Hai-
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On September 30, 1991, members of the Haitian military overthrew the
democratically elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 34 The Haitian military murdered, tortured, imprisoned, and destroyed the property of hundreds of Aristide supporters.3 5 Soon
thereafter, thousands of Haitians sought to escape Haiti on shoddy boats
captained by inexperienced navigators.36 In an effort to thwart another

flood of Haitian immigrants into the United States, the Coast Guard continued its repatriation policy. 37 Because the Coast Guard could not safely
conduct screening proceedings to determine whether the Haitian passengers were entitled to asylum in the United States aboard Coast Guard
cutters, the Department of Defense established temporary screening fa-

cilities at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo, Cuba.3 8 Many
tians interdicted at sea to apply for asylum in the United States. MAUREEN TAFTMORALES & MARK P. SULLIVAN, HAITI: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS IN 1993, at 9 (Congressional Research Service Issue Brief No.
1B93036, 1993). The United States Government deemed the rest to be fleeing Haiti solely
for economic reasons. Id. Between 1972 and 1980, the United States granted asylum to
only 58 of the 5,795 Haitians who requested asylum on grounds that the remaining applicants came only for economic reasons. Shula Beyer, Hungry, Homeless Haitians Continue
to Pour Into Florida, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1980, at A7.
34. Gluck, supra note 18, at 866 n.5 (recounting the brutal military coup of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's first leader to be democratically elected in 200 years). The military
ousted Haiti's first freely elected president after seven months of democracy. Haiti's Military Assumes Power After Troops Arrest the President, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1991, at Al.
Brigadier General Raul Cedras announced that the military had assumed control. Id.
35. See TAFT-MORALES & SULLIVAN, supra note 33, at 7-8. The Department of State

reported "that throughout 1992 Haitians suffered frequent human rights abuses 'including
extrajudicial killings by security forces, disappearances, beatings, and other mistreatment
of detainees and prisoners, arbitrary arrest and detention, and executive interference with
the judicial process.' " Id. at 8. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights reported that
" 'the military [ ] executed, tortured and illegally arrested countless Haitians.' " Id. The
Haitian military and its civilian allies unleashed a terror campaign to eliminate support for
Aristide. Foes of Aristide Reported to Kill 70 in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1994, at A6.
Their tactics included cutting off Aristide supporters' faces to make identification difficult
and dismembering bodies and leaving them in the streets to be consumed by pigs. Id.
Anyone daring to grieve or remove these bodies would be targeted for retaliation. Id.;
Cardinal Urges U.S. to Welcome Haitians, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1991, at B6 (reporting that
less than two months after the overthrow of Aristide, thousands of Haitians were killed).
36. Maya Bell, U.S. Moves to Stop Haitians; Planes, Ships to Form Cordon Around
Nation, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Jan. 16, 1993, at Al. The Coast Guard intercepted

over 40,000 Haitians after the September 1991 coup. Id. at A6.
37. Frank Trejo, U.S. Draws Fire Over Refugees, DALL. MORN. NEWS, Nov. 2, 1992, at
1A, 16A (explaining that when the surge of Haitian immigrants sailed to the United States
after the coup, the Coast Guard initially continued to intercept Haitians pursuant to President Reagan's executive order).
38. Id. Interviews conducted aboard the cutters resulted in screening out and repatriating passengers who the Coast Guard identified as economic migrants, and screening in
and transporting to the United States those passengers who made credible claims as polit-
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Haitians drowned while attempting to escape from Haiti on unsafe ves39
sels and the Guantanamo camps quickly became overcrowded.
Citing the inadequate legal representation of Haitian immigrants and
the health risks posed by overcrowding at Guantanamo, the Haitian Centers Council, Inc. (Haitian Centers) 4" sued the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York. 4 The Haitian Centers al42
leged that the Coast Guard violated their First Amendment rights.
Although the district court ordered the INS to provide Haitians at Guantanamo access to legal representation for screening proceedings,4 3 the
United States Supreme Court subsequently stayed the district court's
order. 44
While the Supreme Court considered the Haitian Centers' appeal of
the stay, President Bush issued Executive Order No. 12,807-better
known as the Kennebunkport Order 4 5-in response to deteriorating conical refugees. Id.; see also TAFT-MORALES & SULLIVAN, supra note 33, at 9 (noting that
the Coast Guard allowed only 30% of those screened to enter the United States).
39. Trejo, supra note 37, at 1A, 16A (reporting that within months after the United
States opened the Guantanamo Bay naval base for refugee processing, it was filled to capacity); see also WASEM, supra note 3, at 2-3 (disclosing that in January 1993, 400 Haitians
drowned en route to Florida). The Haitian service organizations claimed that the INS
violated the organizations' First Amendment rights of freedom of association by denying
them the opportunity to provide Haitian refugees with legal representation. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc. v. McNary, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1040 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). One Haitian who was
detained at Guantanamo described the conditions at the naval base: thousands of Haitians
fought each other to get food; when people attempted to cut in front of others in the meal
line, the military beat them; the toilets were filled to the top; rats, snakes, and scorpions
ran about the camp; and the food and milk were sometimes filled with worms. Surviving
on Toussaintand a Prayer, NEWSDAY, July 22, 1993, at 101. When the detainees protested
these conditions, military officials handcuffed them and sent them to prison. Id. The military held HIV-positive Haitians who had plausible claims for political asylum for 20
months at the Guantanamo base. Out of a Refugee Hell, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 11, 1993,

at B6. They were admitted only after they developed full-blown AIDS and needed hospitalization. Id. Some physicians who visited the camp described the camp "as 'a medical
and public health outrage.' " Id.
40. Sale, 823 F. Supp. at 1028 (noting that the Haitian Centers Council includes various organizations that represent Haitians who were intercepted on the high seas and detained at Guantanamo).
41. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 789 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
42. Id. at 542.
43. Id. at 548.
44. McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1714,1714 (1992). Justice Thomas
granted the application for a stay of the preliminary injunction entered by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York pending the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id.
45. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 3 C.F.R. 303 (1992). The Kennebunkport Order reads:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States of America, .

.

. and whereas:
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ditions at Guantanamo Naval Base. 4 6 The Order commanded the Coast

Guard to intercept vessels that were illegally transporting passengers
from Haiti to the United States and to return the passengers to Haiti
summarily without determining their refugee status. 47 The Haitian Cen-

ters sought to enjoin implementation of the Kennebunkport Order in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.4 8 The

district court denied the injunction, ruling that section 243(h)(1) of the
Refugee Act and Article 33 of the Protocol do not provide relief for Haitian aliens on the high seas.4 9 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit overruled the district court, holding that
section 243(h)(1) protects aliens in international waters. 50

(1) The President has authority to suspend the entry of aliens coming by sea
to the United States without necessary documentation ... and to repatriate
aliens interdicted beyond the territorial sea of the United States;
(2) The international legal obligations of the United States under the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to apply Article 33 of the
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees do not extend to
persons located outside the territory of the United States;
I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of America, hereby order
[the Secretary of State to direct the Coast Guard] as follows:
(3) To return the vessel and its passengers to the country from which it came,
or to another country, when there is reason to believe that an offense is being
committed against the United States immigration laws, or appropriate laws of a
foreign country with which we have an arrangement to assist; provided, however,
that the Attorney General, in his unreviewable discretion, may decide that a person who is a refugee will not be returned without his consent. (d) These actions,
pursuant to this section, are authorized to be undertaken only beyond the territorial sea of the United States.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
46. See supra note 39 (describing deteriorating conditions at the Guantanamo Naval
Base).
47. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 3 C.F.R. 303. Pursuant to the President's authority to
suspend the entry of undocumented aliens entering the United States by sea, President
Bush directed the Coast Guard to "repatriate aliens interdicted beyond the territorial sea
of the United States." Id.
48. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92-CV1258, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8452, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. June 5, 1992), rev'd, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nor.
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
49. Id. at *6 (holding that section 243(h)(1) is not "a source of relief for Haitian aliens
in international waters").
50. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1381 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd sub
nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
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The United States policy of repatriating aliens without first considering
their pleas for refugee protection raises a number of novel issues. 51 Congress did not explicitly state whether section 243(h)(1), as amended by
the Refugee Act of 1980, creates extraterritorial refugee protection.5 2
The statutory amendments and the lack of legislative history on the issue
of extraterritoriality5 3 led to a split between the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit5 4 and the Second Circuit.5 5 The

Supreme Court granted certiorari in McNary v. Haitian Centers Council,

Inc. 56 to resolve the conflict.5 7
In Sale, the Supreme Court reviewed the Coast Guard's repatriation
policy under the Kennebunkport Order 58 and held that neither the Refugee Act of 1980"9 nor the Protocol 6° protects Haitians interdicted on the
high seas from being returned to Haiti, regardless of their qualification as
political refugees. 6 1 The Court presumed that neither instrument provided for withholding of deportation proceedings when the refugees are
found outside of United States territory. 62 The Court refuted the Haitian
Centers' contention that Congress, by amending section' 243(h)(1), intended to extend section 243(h)(1) protection to refugees found outside

51. See EIG, supra note 4, at 7 (commenting that the recent surge in Chinese migrants
attempting to reach the United States raises "serious questions about the feasibility of
keeping all vessels transporting undocumented aliens outside U.S. territory").
52. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 243(h)(1), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2558-62 (1993).
53. See § 243(h)(1), 94 Stat. at 107; McNary, 969 F.2d at 1374 (Walker. J., dissenting)
(explaining that the plain language of section 243(h)(1) is ambiguous).
54. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1514-15 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that Haitians interdicted on the high seas are not entitled to deportation proceedings
under section 243(h)(1) before repatriation to their home country); see infra notes 141-49
and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's decision).
55. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1367 (holding that aliens intercepted on the high seas are
entitled to deportation proceedings under section 243(h)(1) before repatriation to their
home country); see infra notes 150-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's decision).
56. 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). The Commissioner of the INS appealed the Second Circuit's
decision to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
57. See Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2558 (explaining that the Court granted certiorari to resolve
whether the Refugee Act of 1980 or the Protocol protects refugees interdicted
extraterritorially).
58. See supra note 45 (setting forth the text of the Kennebunkport Order).
59. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing section 243(h)(1) as amended
by the Refugee Act of 1980).
60. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (addressing Article 33 of the
Protocol).
61. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2567.
62. Id. at 2551. The Court concluded that "it is presumed that Acts of Congress do
not ordinarily apply outside the [United States] borders." Id.
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of United States territory. 63 The Court reasoned that when Congress
amended section 243(h)(1), its sole intention was to extend the applica-

tion of the section to exclusion proceedings, not to expand the section's
application to the high seas.'
Justice Blackmun, dissenting, argued that the Court incorrectly presumed that section 243(h)(1) has no application outside of the United

States. 65 According to Justice Blackmun, Congress indicated its intent to
apply the statute outside of United States territory by deliberately delet-

ing the territorial restriction 66 and prohibiting both the return and the
deportation of aliens to countries where they would be persecuted. 67 Justice Blackmun asserted that Article 33 of the Protocol 68 applies on the
high seas because the treaty imposes no geographical limitations when it
is interpreted according to general rules of treaty construction.69
On May 7, 1994, President Clinton announced that he would discontinue President Bush's policy of summary repatriation of Haitian boat
people." Although President Clinton's new policy of processing interdicted Haitians' claims for asylum approaches the United Nations' Protocol obligations, the Sale decision authorizes the President to reinstate a
policy of automatic repatriation at any time. 7' As a result of the potential
63. Id. at 2561. Section 243(h)(1) affords protection to refugees by withholding their
deportation into the hands of their persecutors. Id. at 2560-61.
64. Id. Exclusion proceedings refer to the process by which an alien is denied legal
entry into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D) (1988).
65. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2576-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 2577; infra text accompanying note 92 (explaining that the Refugee Act
of 1980 removed the phrase "within the United States" from section 243(h)(1)); see also
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 243(h)(1), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Section 243(h), as amended by
the Refugee Act of 1980, provides that "[t]he Attorney General shall not deport or return
any alien" to a nation if he or she concludes that the life or freedom of the alien "would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(emphasis added). Note that the statute does not afford protection to aliens excluded by
section 241(a)(19) or paragraph (2) of section 243(h). Id.
67. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2574-75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see infra note 92 (explaining
that the Refugee Act of 1980 added the term "return" to the text of section 243(h)(1)).
68. See supra note 17 (setting forth the text of Article 33 of the Protocol).
69. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. See Ann Devroy, U.S. to Expand Offshore Processing of Haitians, WASH. POST,
May 8, 1994, at Al (announcing President Clinton's decision to begin processing Haitian
refugees on large ships anchored offshore of Haiti or in volunteering third countries). This
Note analyzes the Haitian interdiction policy prior to President Clinton's decision to begin
off-shore processing of Haitian boat people. Immigration officials explain that fewer than
five percent of Haitians who apply for political asylum qualify, and it is believed that this
percentage will not change under the new policy. Id. at Al, A27.
71. See infra notes 178-211 and accompanying text (discussing the majority and dissenting opinions of the Sale decision).
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for the reinstatement of an automatic repatriation policy and because of
the due process problems associated with on-board processing, President
Clinton's new policy does not guarantee protection for Haitian
refugees.72
This Note focuses on the question of whether aliens interdicted outside
of United States territory are protected by either the Refugee Act of 1980
or Article 33 of the Protocol. First, this Note explores the United States
historical treatment of asylum-seekers and refugees through statutes and
international agreements. This Note then discusses the judicial split between the Second and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding the
applicability of section 243(h)(1) of the INA and Article 33 of the Protocol to extraterritorial seizures. This Note then analyzes the United States
Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opinions in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., finding that the Court's denial of protection to aliens
who are intercepted extraterritorially violates the mandate of the Refugee Act of 1980 and the United Nations Protocol. Finally, this Note concludes that Sale will lead to disparate treatment among immigrants of
different countries and will encourage foreign noncompliance with the
Protocol.

I.

TREATMENT OF ALIENS FLEEING PERSECUTION

United States domestic law did not address the criteria for the admission of migrants fleeing persecution until Congress enacted the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948. 7 1 The United States indicated its continuing commitment to provide asylum for those who feared persecution by adopting

72. President Clinton's new policy reintroduces the due process problems addressed in
Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1405 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d
794 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text (discussing the United
States government's failure to afford Haitian boat people due process when processing
them aboard Coast Guard cutters). Robert Rubin of the Lawyers Committee for Civil
Rights criticized President Clinton's new policy because "'[potential refugees have the
right to make their case before an appropriate hearing officer in circumstances that enable
them to elaborate their cases fully and calmly and that offer them some access to assistance
and even counsel. All of that is very difficult to accomplish on a ship.' " Roberto Suro,
Safe Havens for Haitians Should Follow, Refugee Advocates Say, WASH. POST, May 9, 1994,
at A13.
73. ch. 647, § 2, 62 Stat. 1009, 1010 (repealed by Act of September 6, 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-554, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 654, 655); see supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (illustrating
that early refugee legislation admitted refugees based on considerations of nationality
rather than whether authorities in their home country subjected them to persecution).
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the Protocol in 19687" and, later, The Refugee Act of 1980. 75 United
States law and international agreements are the primary sources of authority used to regulate the influx of aliens fleeing persecution.76 Over
the last decade, however, the law with respect to asylum-seekers and refugees has generated intense controversy, litigation, and confusion. 7
A.

The 1968 Protocol: InternationalLaw Providing Protectionfor
Aliens Fleeing Persecution

The United Nations Protocol governs the treatment of aliens who are
fleeing persecution.78 Congress has incorporated some of the Protocol's
principles and provisions into United States immigration law.7" In fact,

section 243(h)(1) of the Refugee Act of 1980 is very similar to Article 33
of the Protocol, which absolutely prohibits the return of a fleeing person
to a country if her life or freedom is in jeopardy.8 0

In 1991, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit found that Article 33 of the Protocol does not require United
74. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1361 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd sub

nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (explaining that the United
States ratified the original United Nations Refugee Convention, thereby providing protection for persons fleeing persecution "when it acceded to the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees"); see supra note 17 (providing the text of Article 33 of the Protocol).
75. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 243(h)(1), 94 Stat. 102, 107; see INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987) (explaining that "one of Congress' primary
purposes [in passing the Refugee Act of 1980] was to bring United States refugee law into
conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees").
76. See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 2, at 6-1 to 6-8 (listing United States legislation and international agreements that provide protection for refugees); KURZBAN, supra
note 12, at 158-62 (listing major sources of refugee law).
77. See Asylum and Inspections Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1993) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli). Mr. Mazzoli emphasized the extent of the
United States refugee processing problem by illustrating that between 200,000 and 300,000
asylum cases were pending at the end of fiscal 1992, compared with 150 asylum officers.
Id.; see also Ira H. Mehlman, The New Jet Set, NAT'L REV., Mar. 15, 1993, at 40 (claiming
that as soon as aliens say the magic words, " 'political asylum,' "their chances of remaining
in the United States are 93%); supra note 4 (discussing public concern over the negative
impact of immigration on economic, social, and cultural conditions in the United States).
78. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. The United States acceded to the Protocol in 1968. See
KURZBAN, supra note 12, at 158-59 (noting that "[t]he Protocol adopted Articles 2-34 of
the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees").
79. KURZBAN, supra note 12, at 159 (explaining that the Protocol includes "provisions
...[that] have been incorporated into [United States] domestic law" by comparing the
definition of refugee in Article 1, § 2 of the Protocol with section 101(a)(42) of the INA, as
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988)).
80. Id. (referring to Article 33 of the Protocol, which provides for an absolute ban on
the "return of a person whose life or freedom would be threatened in the country s/he
fled").
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States courts to provide protection for aliens who have not reached
United States territory. 8' The Court found that the Protocol is not a
" 'self-executing' international" accord because it only provides enforceable rights upon congressional implementation. 82 Nevertheless, in addition to international agreements, documents, and other customary
instruments of international law,8 3 many agencies, practitioners, and
courts use the Protocol as a basis for interpreting United States refugee
and asylum law.'
B. The Refugee Act of 1980: Protection Under United States Law for
Persons Who Are Fleeing Persecution
The Refugee Act of 1980,85 enacted with the intent to conform United
States refugee law to the 1967 Protocol,86 is one of Congress' most mean81. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding
that "the Protocol and the history of the United States accession to [the Protocol] leads to
the conclusion that Article 33 is not self-executing and thus provides no enforceable rights
to the Haitian plaintiffs"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
82. Id. (ruling that the Protocol provides no enforceable rights to Haitians who have
not reached United States territory because the Protocol is not self-executing); see Haitian
Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Eleventh Circuit

explained that "(a] 'self-executing' international agreement is one that directly accords enforceable rights to persons without the benefit of Congressional implementation." Baker,
949 F.2d at 1110.
83. KURZBAN, supra note 12, at 160 (referring to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the Collection of International Instruments Concerning Refugees (Geneva 1979)). In some instances, federal courts refer to customary international law to determine claims regarding
human rights. Id. But see In re Medina, 19 1. & N. Dec. 734, 747 (B.I.A. 1988) (holding
that neither international agreements nor customary international law provide deportable
aliens with remedies above and beyond those provided under the INA).
84. See KURZBAN, supra note 12, at 159. The Board of Immigration Appeals and
federal courts sometimes consult a publication by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, entitled The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees (Geneva 1979), to interpret terms and procedures under United States
asylum and refugee law. Id.
85. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 243(h)(1), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing section 243(h)(1) as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980).
86. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,436 (1987) (explaining that one of Congress' principal purposes in passing the Refugee Act of 1980 "was to bring United States
refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees"); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 421 (1984) (stating that Congress amended
section 243(h) and "basically conform[ed] it to the language of Article 33 of the United
Nations Protocol"); see also S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in

1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144 (explaining that the bill's new definition of refugee eliminates
geographical and ideological restrictions to "bring United States law into conformity with
our international treaty obligations under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees"); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 212, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1980), reprinted in
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ingful humanitarian acts.8 7 This amendment to the INA 88 is the principal
law governing United States policy toward persons who are fleeing persecution. 89 The Refugee Act of 1980 made three fundamental changes to

the INA that protected refugee or refugee-related entrants. First, Congress changed section 207 to provide fleeing persons with an overseas
refugee-processing procedure in their native countries or in third coun-

tries.90 Second, Congress amended section 208 to create a statutory right
for aliens to apply for political asylum if they are "physically present in
the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such
alien's status, to apply for asylum."9 1 Third, Congress redrafted section
243(h)(1) to guarantee that any alien who qualifies as a refugee will not
be returned to his or her home country. Further, Congress deleted the
territorial restriction, within the United States, from the language of that
92
provision.
A person who fears persecution in her native country may gain legal
admission to the United States as a refugee or an asylee. The United

States considers an individual to be a refugee if (1) she is outside of the
country of her nationality,93 and (2) she is unable or unwilling to return to
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 160, 160 (explaining that the Senate bill provided for withholding deportation of aliens to countries where they would be persecuted, unless the Protocol would
permit an alien's deportation).
87. 126 CONG. REC. 4501 (1980) (providing statements of Rep. Rodino who commented that the Refugee Act of 1980 is "one of the most important pieces of humanitarian
legislation ever enacted by a U.S. Congress").
88. ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
89. Under United States law, persons who are fleeing persecution may seek entry into
the United States if they can be classified in one of several categories. KURZBAN, supra
note 12, at 162. The two most important classifications for Haitian refugees are (1) political asylees under section 208 and (2) "persons seeking withholding of deportation or exclusions for fear of persecution" under section 243(h)(1). Id. The United States cannot
repatriate Haitians likely to encounter political persecution in Haiti if they satisfy the
terms of these categories. Id. Haitian refugees also can gain admittance into the United
States under the INA if they fall into other refugee-related categories such as "normal flow
refugees" covered by section 207(a); "refugees of special humanitarian concern" addressed
in section 207(b); parolees encompassed by section 212(d)(5); "persons granted extended
voluntary departure" under section 204(e); and those granted "temporary protected status" (TPS) under section 244(a). Id.
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3) (1988). As amended, section 207(a)(3) of the INA authorizes Consular Officers in United States Embassies overseas and INS officers to process
refugees who are admitted under section 207(a)(1). Id.
91. Id. § 1158(a).
92. See id. § 1253(h)(1). Section 1253(h)(1) also prohibits the Attorney General from
"deport[ing] or return[ing]" aliens who are likely to be subjected to racial, religious, or
political persecution. Id.; see supra note 23 (setting forth the text of section 243(h)(1) as
amended).
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).

1994]

Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.

that country due to previous persecution or a genuine fear of future per-

secution on the basis of her race, religion, nationality, or political
opinion.9 4
The United States will grant asylum to a migrant who satisfies the statutory definition of a refugee under the INA 95 and is either within United
States territory or is at a land border or port of entry.96 The INA also
grants asylum to aliens located outside of the United States if they qualify
as refugees. 97 For example, the President may qualify a person as a refugee even if the person remains within the country of her nationality. 98
94. Id. (providing that an alien is a refugee if she refuses or is unable to return to her

country due to past "persecution or a well-founded fear of [future] persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion")
Id.
Society often confuses the use of the terms " 'refugee' " and " 'asylee.' " See

STEEL,

supra note 3, § 8.07(a). A migrant must only meet the legal standard of refugee to be
treated as such. Id. (explaining that labeling an alien as a refugee "is definitional only, and

does not constitute a status"). Asylum, however, is a status granted to migrants who seek
to enter, or have already entered, the United States and who qualify as a refugee. Id.
The Refugee Act of 1980 defined refugees as persons outside of United States territory
who seek refugee status and persons within United States territory who seek asylum. 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see STEEL, supra note 3, § 8.02. A person is considered a refugee
under'section 207 even if she is located within the country of her nationality. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1157(c)(1).

95. STEEL, supra note 3, § 8.07 (explaining that interchangeable use of the terms " 'refugee,' "" 'asylum,' " and " 'asylee' " is incorrect). "Asylum" is a status granted to aliens
who satisfy the definition of refugee, who made entry or who seeks to make entry into the
United States, and who meets the requirements for obtaining asylum under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (setting forth asylum procedures); see also id.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining the term refugee).

96. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (providing that to qualify as an asylee, a person also must be
"physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry"); see
FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 2, at 6-24 (explaining that persons at a port of entry can
apply for political asylum); KURZBAN, supra note 12, at 165 (noting examples of aliens
requesting asylum in the United States including "Haitian and Mariel-Cuban applicants
who present themselves at land borders or ports of entry when seeking refuge in the U.S.,
or the El Salvadoran and/or Nicaraguan applicants who seek asylum after entering the
U.S.").
97. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157, 1158 (providing for the admission of a maximum numbe' of

aliens who satisfy the definition of refugee and apply for admission from outside the
United States or at its borders).
98. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(B); see id. § 1157(a)(1) to (3) (providing for annual designations
by the President, in consultation with Congress, of those people who qualify as refugees
based on humanitarian or national interests); id. § 1157(b) (noting that the President may
admit, "after appropriate consultation" with Congress, refugees of particular humanitarian
concern if an unanticipated emergency makes their admission a "grave humanitarian concern[] or is otherwise in the national interest"); see also

JOYCE

C.

VIALET, REFUGEE

AD-

1, 3 (Congressional Research Service Issue Brief
No. IB89025, 1993) (stating that in 1980, President Carter approved the admission of 3,500
Cubans in Havana, Cuba (also known as the Mariel Boatlift); in 1988, President Reagan
MISSIONS AND RESErLEMENT POLICY

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 44:321

In the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress amended section 243(h)(1) of the

INA to provide for mandatory withholding of deportation and a prohibition against the return of a refugee to her native country.9 9 Under the
Refugee Act, eligibility requirements are similar for asylum claims and
withholding of deportation. 1°° Under both proceedings, the migrant
must show that she will be persecuted or that she has a reasonable fear of
being persecuted upon return to her country of origin.1 0 ' Nonetheless, an
alien is more likely to be admitted into the United States when seeking
asylum than when requesting withholding of deportation.10 2 Judicial
scrutiny is greater in deportation proceedings than in asylum proceedings10 3 because withholding of deportation is mandatory, while asylum is
discretionary." ° In deportation proceedings, an alien must demonstrate
a " 'clear probability' "that she will be subject to persecution; whereas in
asylum hearings, an alien need only demonstrate a" 'well-founded fear'"
05
of persecution.'
admitted 15,000 refugees from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; and in 1989, President Bush granted admission to 22,500 refugees, primarily from the Soviet Union).
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1). As amended, section 243(h)(1) requires the Attorney General to withhold deportation if officials determine that the alien is threatened by persecution. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1357-58 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd
sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); see also KURZBAN,
supra note 12, at 174-75 (explaining that, under certain circumstances, the statute requires
the Attorney General to withhold deportation of refugees).
100. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (providing that the Attorney General shall establish a
procedure to grant asylum to aliens who are refugees within the meaning of the INA) with
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (prohibiting the Attorney General from repatriating aliens whose
lives or freedom will be threatened due to race, religion, nationality, or social or political
affiliation). An alien may apply for both political asylum under section 208 and withholding of deportation under section 243(h)(1) if she satisfies the definition of refugee under
the INA. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 2, at 6-7, 6-8; see STEEL, supra note 3, § 8.12(a)
(explaining that when certain conditions exist, an alien may apply for "adjustment of status" after one year of asylum). Withholding of deportation requires a more stringent
showing of proof of persecution than the granting of asylum. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra
note 2, at 6-8.
101. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (defining a "refugee" as a person who is outside of
the country of her nationality and who will not return to that country because of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality or social or political affiliation); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987) (explaining that an alien is entitled to withholding
of deportation if she demonstrates that "''it is more likely than not' " that she will be
persecuted (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984))).
102. See STEEL, supra note 3, § 8.12(b). Asylum is preferable to withholding of deportation because asylum is a general provision, whereas withholding of deportation only applies to specified countries. Id. Also, while asylum usually results in permanent residence
status, withholding of deportation only continues as long as the alien can show that she will
be subject to persecution if returned to her home country. Id.
103. Id.
104. See McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981).
105. See Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 430.
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II.

9 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.

DIVERGENT HOLDINGS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL PROTECrION FOR
REFUGEES

A.

The Majority Rule: Protectionfor Potential Refugees Within the
United States Only

Before Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, section 243(h)(1) of
the INA only withheld the deportation of refugees who were legally present within the United States.1" 6 In Leng May Ma v. Barber,'0 7 the United
States Supreme Court defined the phrase" 'within the United States' " as
it appeared in section 243(h)(1) prior to 1980.108 No court addressed the
significance of Congress' deletion of this phrase until a group representing interdicted Haitians challenged President Reagan's interdiction
10 9
policy.
1.

Leng May Ma: Denial of Protection Outside United States
Territory

Using the INA as it existed prior to its amendment in 1980,110 the
Supreme Court in Leng May Ma v. Barber,decided that an alien must be
legally present within the United States to come within the protection of
section 243(h)(1) of the INA."' In Leng May Ma, the petitioner, an immigrant from China, applied for withholding of deportation under section
12
243(h)(1) of the INA, while the INS released her on temporary parole'
within the United States. 1 3 Leng May Ma alleged that she would be
killed or subjected to physical persecution by the Chinese government if
she were returned to China.1 4 After being denied section 243(h)(1) protection, Leng May Ma sought a writ of habeas corpus. 1 5 The district
106. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1509 (11th Cir. 1992). The
Eleventh Circuit explained that before Congress amended section 243(h), it read:
"The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien
within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be
subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion and for
such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason."
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976)).
107. 357 U.S. 185 (1958), superseded by statute as stated in Amanullah v. Nelson, 811
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).
108. Id. at 188-89.
109. See infra notes 124-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Haitian Refugee
Centers' challenge of President Reagan's interdiction policy).
110. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C § 1253(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
111. Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 189.
112. See supra note 12 (explaining the meaning of parole).
113. Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 186.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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court denied the writ and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling."1 6 Leng May Ma appealed the ruling
17
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court ruled that aliens who are on temporary parole are
not legal entrants into the United States, even though they are physically
present within the United States."' The Court held that because Leng
May Ma was not legally present within the United States, she was not
of section 243(h)(1). 1 19 The
eligible for protection within the meaning 20
INS subsequently deported Leng May Ma.'
2.

Post-Refugee Act Decisions: Limiting Section 243(h)(1) Protection
to Aliens Within the United States

Even after Congress deleted the phrase "within the United States"
from section 243(h)(1) of the Refugee Act of 1980,121 courts continued
to limit the application of section 243(h)(1) of the INA to aliens who were
legally and physically present in the United States. Haitian migrants interdicted on the high seas were the only plaintiffs to raise the issue of
whether Congress' omission of the phrase "within the United States"
eliminated geographical restrictions on the applicability of section
243(h)(1).1 22 No court addressed the issue of whether section 243(h)(1)
applies extraterritorially until nearly thirty years after the Leng May Ma
123
decision.
116. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 241 F.2d 85,86 (9th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
117. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 353 U.S. 981 (1957) (granting certiorari).
118. Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 188 (explaining that the Court historically has treated
aliens who are in custody pending determination of their admissibility as "not [ 'within
the United States' for purposes of section 243(h)").
119. Id. at 185-90. Leng May Ma's "excluded alien" status precluded her legal presence
within the United States. Id. at 186.
120. Id. at 190.
121. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 243(h)(1), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The legislative history of the
Refugee Act of 1980 does not provide any reason for Congress' deletion of "within the
United States" from section 243(h). See S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141-64.
122. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (1993) (ruling
that section 243(h)(1) does not apply extraterritorially); Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1360 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that section 243(h)(1) applies extraterritorially), rev'd sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); Haitian
Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1518 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that section
243(h)(1) does not apply extraterritorially); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F.
Supp. 1396, 1406-07 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that section 243(h)(1) does not apply extraterritorially), aff'd, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
123. See infra part II.A.2 and accompanying text (discussing cases examining whether
section 243(h)(1) protects Haitians interdicted on the high seas).
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In HaitianRefugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey,124 the plaintiffs 25 challenged
President Reagan's interdiction policy' 26 in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the policy violated the
rights of interdicted Haitians under the INA, as amended by the Refugee
Act of 1980.127 The Haitian Refugee Center also claimed that the program failed to fulfill the " 'nonrefoulement obligation' ,128 imposed by
Article 33 of the Protocol. 29 The district court dismissed the complaint,
reasoning that although the plaintiffs had standing to sue, the Haitian
30
Center failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.1

Specifically, the district court held that the INA and the Refugee Act of
1980 provided no relief to Haitians interdicted outside of United States
territory.'13 The court reasoned that because section 243(h)(1) is located
in part V of the INA, which governs deportation and adjustment of status, section 243(h)(1) only applies to aliens " 'in the United States.' "132
The court concluded that in this case, the intercepted Haitians were not
entitled to the benefit of section 243(h)(1) because " 'exclusion or depor-

tation proceedings' are restricted to aliens arriving 'at any port within the
United States.' ,133
The district court further found that the interdiction program did not

violate the Protocol because the Protocol is not self-executing.'"3 As a
result, the court concluded that the treaty's provisions are not a source of
rights under United States domestic law.' 3 5 In other words, the Protocol

alone affords no protection to refugees unless Congress implements legis124. 600 F. Supp. at 1396.
125. One plaintiff, the Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. (HRC), is a nonprofit membership
corporation whose sole purpose "is to promote the well-being of Haitian refugees through
appropriate programs and activities, including legal representation." Id. at 1401. HRC
and two of its members were plaintiffs. Id.
126. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (setting forth President Reagan's
interdiction policy).
127. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1401-03.
128. Id. at 1401; see also CASSELL's FRENCH DICIONARY 627 (1981) (defining
"refouler" as meaning "It]o drive back ... to repel").
129. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1401; see supra note 17 (setting forth the provisions of the
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees).
130. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1401-03.
131. Id. at 1404.
132. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1253(a)).
133. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1362).
134. Id. at 1406; see also Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding
"that the Protocol's provisions were not themselves a source of rights under our law unless
and until Congress implemented them by appropriate legislation").
135. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1405 (explaining that "it has long been established that for
a treaty to provide rights enforceable in a United States Court, the treaty must be one
which is self-executing").
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lation to provide such protection. 1 36 The court warned that the Refugee
Act of 1980 does not grant any rights to aliens outside of the United

States even though Congress implemented the Protocol through the Refugee Act of 1980.137 Accordingly, the court held that the Protocol does
38
not protect aliens who are interdicted outside of United States borders.'
The Gracey court also noted that the President's authority to interdict

illegal aliens on the high seas arises from statutory and constitutional
sources. 1 39 The court determined that these provisions clearly demonstrate congressional intent to grant broad discretion in alien immigration
policy to the President.14 °
In Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker,'4 ' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Gracey court's decision
regarding the substantive protections available to Haitian migrants under
the INA.' 4 2 Specifically, the court concluded that Haitians interdicted on
the high seas receive no protection under section 243(h)(1) because it is
136. Id. (stating that the treaty "provided that the signatories were to communicate to
the United Nations the 'laws and regulations which they adopt to ensure the application of
the present Protocol' " (quoting Protocol, supra note 16, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6226, 606
U.N.T.S. 267)).
137. Id. at 1406-07; see Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 243(h), 94 Stat. 102,
107 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
138. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1406-07.
139. Id. at 1399-1400. The court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1950), which states that a sovereign's right to exclude
aliens is inherent in the executive's power to control foreign affairs. Gracey, 600 F. Supp.
at 1400.
The Gracey court also noted two statutory provisions that grant the President express
authority to suspend the entry of illegal aliens on the high seas: 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and 8
U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1). Id. at 1399. The Court noted that section 1182(f) provides:
"Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens
into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States,
he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend
the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens ... or impose on the entry of aliens
any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate."
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)). In addition, the court noted that section 1185(a)(1) provides that "'[u]nless otherwise ordered by the President, it shall be unlawful-(1) for any
alien to ... enter the United States except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and
orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe.'"
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1)).
140. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1399-1400 (explaining " 'that any policy toward aliens is
vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct
of foreign relations'" (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)));
see also Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542 (noting that "[w]hen Congress prescribes a procedure
concerning the admissibility of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power" but
rather "[i]t is implementing an inherent executive power").
141. 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992).
142. Id. at 1510 (citing Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1404).
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located in part V of the INA, which only applies to aliens "in the United

States."143
The Haitian Center sought a temporary restraining order in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida to enjoin President Reagan's Haitian interdiction policy on the grounds that it violated
the Protocol and the INS procedures that protect refugees from forced
repatriation. 144 The district court granted the injunction1 45 and the defendants sought a stay of enforcement from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.' 4 6
The Eleventh Circuit asserted that in 1980 Congress deleted the phrase
"'within the United States' " from section 243(h)(1) and added the words
" 'or return' " in order "to conform with Article 33 of the Protocol.' 1 47
The court concluded that section 243(h)(1) applies only within the territory of each signatory.148 Therefore, aliens interdicted outside of United

States borders may not avail themselves of any rights under section
49
243(h)(1).1

B.

The Minority View: Refugee Protection for All

In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit ruled that section 243(h)(1) does afford protection
to aliens interdicted on the high seas.' 50 In Haitian Centers Council, Inc.
v. McNary, the Haitian Centers appealed a district court's denial of their
request for a temporary restraining order against President Bush's Hai143. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1253(a) (1988)).
144. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (S.D. Fla.), rev'd, 949
F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992). The Haitian Refugee
Center, Inc. alleged that the United States Government violated INS procedural rules and
Article 33 of the Protocol by repatriating Haitians without providing them with adequate
legal protection. Id.
145. Id. at 1578-79. The order prohibited the government from repatriating Haitians
being held aboard United States vessels, on land under United States control, or at
Guantanamo.
146. Baker, 953 F.2d at 1504-05.
147. Id. at 1509-10.

148. Id. at 1510. The Eleventh Circuit, using the same reasoning as the Gracey court,
found that section 243(h)(1) does not apply extraterritorially because of its location in part
V of the INA, and because section 208 provides asylum proceedings only to those "in the
United States or at its borders or a port of entry." Id.; see Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v.
Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1404 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
149. Baker, 953 F.2d at 1510 (holding that because the Coast Guard intercepted Haitians on the high seas, they are not at a land border or port of entry, and thus are not
protected by section 243(h)(1)).
150. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350,1367 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd sub
norn. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
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tian interdiction policy.' 5 1 The Second Circuit ruled that the plain meaning of section 243(h)(1), as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980,152
protected Haitians interdicted in international waters. 5 3 The court of appeals rejected the government's assertion of a presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic laws regarding Haitians interdicted on
the high seas.' 54 The Second Circuit found that the presumption against

extraterritoriality arises only when a statutory provision is unclear or
when it conflicts with the interests or the jurisdictions of foreign countries.155 According to the Second Circuit, the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply to the interdicted Haitians because section
243(h)(1), as amended, clearly expresses congressional intent that extraterritoriality does not affect the meaning of term " 'alien' " as used in the
provision. 5 6 The court further reasoned that prohibiting the return of
interdicted Haitians did not compromise the interests or the jurisdictions
of foreign nations.' 57
The government also argued that because of the close relationship between section 243(h)(1) and section 243(h)(2) of the INA,' 5 8 section
151. Id. at 1353; see Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92-CV-1258, 1992 WL
155853 at *11(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1992) (denying a request for a temporary restraining order). The Second Circuit determined that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar it
from considering the extraterritorial issue involved in this case, which the Eleventh Circuit
previously had decided in Haitian Refugee Centers, Inc. v. Baker, because of the recent
issuance of the Kennebunkport Order and other changes in United States Haitian immigration policy. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1355-57; see supra note 45 and accompanying text
(discussing President Bush's Kennebunkport Order).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 20-27 (discussing the Refugee Act of 1980 and
its effect on section 243(h)(1)).
153. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1357-58.
154. Id. at 1358.
155. Id. (ruling that the presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic
laws is a canon of construction courts use to determine unexpressed congressional intent);
see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991) (holding that the presumption against extraterritorial construction of domestic
laws is designed to protect against inadvertent conflicts between domestic and foreign laws
"which could result in international discord"), superseded by statute as stated in Stender v.
Lucky Stores, 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
156. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1358.
157. Id. The Second Circuit also noted that "Congress [knows] 'how to place the high
seas within the jurisdictional reach of a statute.' " Id. (quoting Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,440 (1989)). Accordingly, Congress extended
extraterritorial jurisdiction "by making § 243(h)(1) apply to 'any alien' without regard to
location." Id. The McNary court also explained that section 243(h) has extraterritorial
application "[o]nly when the United States itself acts extraterritorially." Id. The United
States acts extraterritorially when it intercepts Haitians on the high seas.
158. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988) (forbidding the Attorney General from deporting or returning any alien who may be subject to persecution) with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h)(2)(C) (1988) (specifying that the Attorney General may deport or return an
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243(h)(1) does not apply to those "who have not arrived in the United
States." 15 9 The government urged this conclusion because section
243(h)(2) denies the protections of section 243(h)(1) where a reasonable
belief exists that " 'the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime
outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United
States.' ,160 Responding to the government's contention, the court explained that Congress included the phrase " 'prior to the arrival of the

alien in the United States' " primarily to prevent the application of section 243(h)(1) to aliens who are nonpolitical criminals. 16 1 The Second
Circuit found that the government's interpretation of the section violated

the principles of statutory construction because it required the court to
re-read the phrase " 'within the United States'" into section 243(h)(1).
A phrase which Congress eliminated in the Refugee Act of 1980.162 The
163
Second Circuit was unwilling to accept such a result.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit rejected the government's argument
that the location of section 243(h)(1) in part V of the INA indicated that
it only applied extraterritorially. 1 6' The court opined that the statute is
alien who is subject to persecution if she.committed a serious crime outside of the United
States).
159. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1359.
160. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C)).
161. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C)). This limitation complies with United
States domestic interests in preventing alien criminals from entering this country, and with
United States foreign policy interests in refusing to grant a "safe haven to non political
criminals fleeing from other countries." Id.
162. Id. (citing American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S.Ct. 2465, 2475 (1992), and
Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 337 (1930)). The Second Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court ruled that the doctrine of statutory construction requires the court to read Congress'
change in the language of a statute to have some effect. Id. The court also mentioned the
often-quoted principle of statutory construction that" 'Congress does not intend sub silentioto enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded.' " Id. (quoting Nachman Corp.
v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
The Supreme Court in United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269 (1929), expounding the fundamental principle of statutory construction that when "doubts exist and
construction is permissible, reports of the committees of Congress and statements by those
in charge of the measure ... may be taken into consideration to aid in the ascertainment of
the true legislative intent." Id. at 278. The Missouri Pacific Court added that, "where the
language of an enactment is clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to
absurd or impracticable consequences ... legislative history may not be used to support a
construction that adds to or takes from the significance of the words employed." Id.
163. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1359.
164. Id. at 1359-60. The court criticized the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Baker because the Eleventh Circuit almost exclusively relied on Congress' placement of section
243(h)(1) in part V of the INA when it concluded that the section has no extraterritorial
effect. Id. at 1359; see HaitianRefugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1510 (11th Cir.
1992); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v.Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1404 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd,
809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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located in part V merely because it was placed there prior to the 1980
amendment. 165 Although Congress explicitly limited provisions of part V
to aliens within the United States, the court found that it does not follow
166
conclusively that section 243(h)(1) as amended is similarly affected.
The Second Circuit did not address whether Article 33 of the Protocol

is self-executing. 167 Instead, the court recognized that Congress intended
to bring United States refugee law in compliance with the Protocol. 168
By analyzing the plain meaning of Article 33 of the Convention, 16 9 the
court concluded that a contracting state's refouler responsibilities extend
170
to the high seas.
In effect, the Second Circuit's decision requiring the Coast Guard to
withhold the deportation of refugees intercepted beyond United States
borders directly contradicted the Eleventh Circuit's refusal to extend

such protection to Haitians intercepted on the high seas. 171 Consequently, in Sale v. Haitian Refugee Centers, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed the divergent rulings of the federal circuits regarding the
extraterritorial application of section 243(h)(1).

165. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1360 (stating that the location of the section "tends to prove
that if Congress had meant to limit § 243(h)(1)'s scope to aliens 'in the United States', it
surely knew how to do that").
166. Id. at 1360-61 (noting that very little prior litigation under section 243(h)(1) focused on the term " 'return' " in the amended section, and concluding that the Kennebunkport Order violated the no-return provision of section 243(h)(1)). The Second
Circuit also explained that " '[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' " Id. at
1360 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987)).
167. See supra notes 134-36 (discussing the concept of self-executing treaties).
168. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1361-66.
169. Id. at 1361; see supra note 17 and accompanying text (providing the text of Article
33).
170. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1366; see supra note 128 and accompanying text (defining
refouler).
171. The Second Circuit determined that it was not bound by the Eleventh Circuit's
ruling because the plaintiffs were not parties to the Eleventh Circuit action. McNary, 969
F.2d at 1355. The plaintiffs in McNary were interdicted under President Bush's Kennebunkport Order, while the Haitians in Baker protested President Reagan's interdiction
program. Id.; see Interdiction Agreement Between the United States of America and Haiti, supra note 32. Under President Reagan's interdiction program, the United States repatriated those aliens who could not prove that they were refugees. See Haitian Refugee
Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1501 (11th Cir. 1992). The Kennebunkport Order, however, repatriated aliens without determining if they were refugees. See supra note 45 (discussing the Kennebunkport Order); see also McNary, 969 F.2d at 1355.

1994]

III.

Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.

SALE V. HAITIAN CENTERS COUNCIL,

INC.: LEGAL AND PHYSICAL

ENTRANCE REQUIRED FOR PROTECTION UNDER SECTION

243(H)(1)
In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,172 the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Second Circuit's holding in Haitian Centers Council,
Inc. v. McNary. 7 3 Referencing the structure of the INA and the history
of the Refugee Act of 1980, the Supreme Court refused to extend section
243(h)(1) protection to aliens interdicted on the high seas. 74 The Court
175
applied a presumption against extraterritoriality of federal enactments

and concluded that the Court should construe section 243(h)(1) and the
Protocol to apply only within the United States.1 76 Thus, the Court held

when she is
that an alien acquires protection under section 243(h)(1)1 only
77
physically and legally present within the United States.
A.

The Majority: No Protectionfor Haitian Refugees on the High Seas

Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, began by analyzing the text
and structure of the INA.1 78 The Court refused to construe section
243(h)(1) to compel the Attorney General to withhold deportation of
aliens intercepted outside of United States borders.' 79 According to the
Court, part V of the INA, in which section 243(h)(1) is located, does not
authorize the Attorney General to conduct deportation proceedings extraterritorially."8 ° The Court added that even if part V of the INA en172. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
173. Id. at 2567 (reversing the Second Circuit's decision in McNary to grant section
243(h)(1) protection to Haitian refugees on the high seas). The Supreme Court quoted
Judge Edwards' concurrence in Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey, stating that " '[tihis
case presents a painfully common situation in which desperate people, convinced that they
can no longer remain in their homeland, take desperate measures to escape. Although the
human crisis is compelling, there is no solution to be found in a judicial remedy.' " Id.
(quoting Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794,841 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards,
J., concurring)).
174. Id. at 2559-62.
175. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (explaining the underlying principles of the presumption against extraterritoriality).
176. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2560.
177. Id. at 2567.
178. Id. at 2559-60.
179. Id.
180. Id. The Court referred to section 1158(a) of the United States Code. Section
1158(a) directs the Attorney General to "establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry ... to apply for asylum." 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988). The Court also relied on its decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
in stating that "Itihis standard for asylum is similar, but not quite as strict as the standard
applicable to a withholding of deportation pursuant to § 243(h)(1)." Sale, 113 S. Ct. at
2554 n.11 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 44:321

compassed procedures outside of the United States, the presumption
against extraterritoriality for congressional acts mandates that section
243(h)(1) only be applied within United States borders.1 8 1 The Court
ruled that if Congress intended section 243(h)(1) to apply extraterritori82
ally, it would have explicitly provided for such an application.
Next, the Court reviewed the history of the Refugee Act of 1980.183
Justice Stevens referred to the Court's ruling in Leng May Ma v. Barber1 8 4 to illustrate that the phrase " 'within the United States' " pertains
to the legal status of an alien, rather than her physical location.1 85 The

Supreme Court found that the Refugee Act of 1980 eliminated the longstanding distinction between deportation and exclusion proceedings for
purposes of section 243(h)(1). 18 6 The Court noted that in 1953, the INA,
as interpreted in Leng May Ma, did not provide section 243(h)(1) protection to aliens who were seeking admission and trying to avoid exclusion
because its applicability was limited to those " 'within the United
States.' "1" The law did not treat excludable aliens as having entered the
United States, even though they were physically within United States territory or at its border.188 Conversely, after its amendment in 1980, the

INA treated those who entered United States territory and sought to
181. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2560 (referring to Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)). In addition, the Court noted that although the
presumption against extraterritorially serves to prevent conflicts with foreign laws, "the
presumption has a foundation broader than the desire to avoid conflict with the laws of
other nations." Id.
182. Id. (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440
(1989), which held that "[w]hen it desires to do so, Congress knows how to place the high
seas within the jurisdictional reach of a statute").
183. Id. at 2560-62; see supra note 21 (discussing the legislative history of the Refugee
Act of 1980).
184. 357 U.S. 185 (1958), superseded by statute as stated in Amanullah v. Nelson, 811
F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1987); see supra part II.A.1 (discussing the Court's decision in Leng May
Ma).
185. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2560.
186. Id. at 2560-61. The Court explained that the legislative history of the 1980 amendment indicated that Congress intended "to apply § 243(h) to exclusion as well as to deportation proceedings." Id. at 2561. The Court referred to the House Report and noted that
"the changes [in section 243(h)] 'require ... the Attorney General to withhold deportation
of aliens who qualify as refugees and who are in exclusion as well as deportation, proceedings.' " Id. at 2561 n.33 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 30 (1979)). The Court insisted that the term " 'return,' "which was added in the 1980
amendment, referred only to exclusion proceedings. Id. at 2561. Thus, the Court concluded that the INA applies to both deportation and exclusion hearings. Id. To hold
otherwise, the majority argued, would make the word " 'deport'" in section 243(h) redundant. Id. at 2560. Otherwise, the section would read: the Attorney General shall not "deport" or "deport." Id.
187. Id. at 2561.
188. Id.
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avoid deportation as aliens " 'within the United States' " for purposes of
section 243(h)(1).' 89 According to the majority, while the 1980 amendment extended protection to excludable aliens, it continued to maintain
the presumption that section 243(h)(1) applied only to aliens found
within United States borders. 190
After reviewing the history of the Refugee Act of 1980, the majority
analyzed the text and negotiating history of Article 33 of the Protocol to
determine whether the Protocol imposes an extraterritorial responsibility
beyond the language of the Refugee Act.191 The Court conceded that the
Refugee Act should not be read to limit the Protocol to the extent that

the Protocol is more generous than the Refugee Act.' 92 The Court, however, concluded that the negotiating history of Article 33 and the text of
193
Articles 33.1 and 33.2 do not require extraterritorial protection.
B.

The Dissent: Domestic and InternationalProtectionfor All
Refugees

In dissent, 94 Justice Blackmun concentrated on the Protocol and Congress' deletion of the phrase " 'within the United States'" from section
189. Id. The majority explained that the Court historically recognized additional rights
and privileges for migrants who, regardless of legality of entry, are within the United
States, while it denied these same rights and privileges to those aliens 'on the threshold of
initial entry.' " kd (quoting Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958), superceded
by statute as stated in Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987)); see Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)). In Shaughnessy, the Court ruled
that when United States officials harbored an alien on Ellis Island, he did not enter the
United States, and he therefore did not have the same due process rights as an alien who
entered the United States. Id. at 212-13.
190. Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2561. The Court explained that "[n]ot a scintilla of evidence of
.. [an intent to provide for extraterritorial application of the act] can be found in the
legislative history." Id. The Supreme Court emphasized that Congress would not make a
dramatic change, such as extending the application of the Act outside United States borders, without explicitly stating its intention to do so. Id.
191. Id. at 2562. The Court explained that if the Protocol did impose such a responsibility, then "under the Supremacy Clause, that broader treaty obligation might then provide the controlling rule of law." Id.; see also id. at 2562 n.35. The Court cited Murray v.
The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,118 (1804), which held that" 'an act of congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.' " Sale, i13 S.Ct. at 2562 n.35 (quoting Murray, 6 U.S. (12 Cranch) at 118). The
Supremacy Clause provides that "[tihis Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
192. Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2563.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 2568-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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243(h)(1) of the INA. 195 Because Congress enacted the Refugee Act to

conform United States domestic law to Article

33,196

Justice Blackmun

analyzed the Protocol as the "backdrop against which [section 243(h)(1)]
must be understood."' 9 7 Justice Blackmun concluded that the texts and
histories of section 243(h)(1) and the Protocol require protection for all
refugees, wherever found. 9 8
According to the dissent, Article 33 unambiguously prohibits the re-

turn of a refugee without geographical limits." 9 Justice Blackmun criti-

cized the majority for deferring to the Protocol's negotiating history for
guidance rather than relying on the Protocol's language . °° He stressed
that the majority erred in relying on the Protocol's negotiating history
because the negotiators' oral statements were not communicated to their
respective governments or to the ratifying body. 201 Justice Blackmun
also provided examples illustrating the United States' repeated acknowledgments that the Protocol applied on the high seas. 2
195. Id. at 2568 (arguing that the majority ignored the mandates of the Protocol and the
Refugee Act of 1980 by denying Haitians outside of the United States protection from
their persecutors). Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for deciding "that the forced
repatriation of the Haitian refugees is perfectly legal, because the word 'return' does not
mean return, because the opposite of 'within the United States' is not outside the United
States." Id. (citations omitted).
196. Id. The dissent quoted Justice Scalia's partial concurrence and dissent in INS v.
Doherty, stating that " 'the nondiscretionary duty imposed by § 243(h) parallels the United
States' mandatory non-refoulement obligations under Article 33.1.' " Id. (quoting INS v.
Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719, 729 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part)).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2568-77.
199. See id. at 2569-70.
200. Id. at 2571-73. Justice Blackmun wrote that "[it is axiomatic that a treaty's plain
language must control absent 'extraordinarily strong contrary evidence.' " Id. at 2570
(quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982)). Justice Blackmun argued that, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, relying "on a
treaty's negotiating history ... is a disfavored alternative of last resort, appropriate only
where the terms of the document are obscure or lead to 'manifestly absurd or unreasonable' results." Id. at 2571; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.
32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 I.L.M. 692.
201. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2571 (citing Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 360 (1934)).
202. Id. at 2568-69. Justice Blackmun referred to a letter from the Office of the Attorney General to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, which read that " '[alliens who have not reached our borders (such
as those on board interdicted vessels) are ... protected ... by the U.N. Convention and
Protocol.' " Id. at 2568 n.3 (alterations in original) (quoting United States as a Country of
Mass First Asylum: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 208-09 (1981)); see also STEEL,
supra note 3, § 8.02 (explaining that Congress adopted the definition of refugee in the
Refugee Act of 1980 from the United Nations definition of refugee-"persons outside of

1994]

Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.

With respect to section 243(h)(1) of the INA, Justice Blackmun supported the Second Circuit's reasoning in Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v.
McNary.20 3 He criticized the majority for failing to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words contained in the provision as amended. 2° He
concluded that the presumption against extraterritorial application of
United States domestic law did not apply in the Sale case because Con-

gress' intent in its 1980 amendment of section 243(h)(1) is clear: 20 the

Attorney General cannot return a refugee to her persecutors, regardless
of her presence " 'within the United States.' ,206
The dissent criticized the majority's reliance on Leng May Ma v. Bar-

ber,20 7 which it found to be "a lone case from this Court that is not even
mentioned in the legislative history and that had been on the books a full

22 years before the amendments' enactment. ' 20 8 Justice Blackmun emphasized that "[w]hen Congress in 1980 removed the phrase 'within the
United States' [from section 243(h)(1)], it did not substitute any other
geographical limitation. ''2 1 The fact that Congress made changes to
other provisions that did contain geographical restrictions, 2 10 Justice
the United States seeking refugee status, and persons inside the United States seeking
asylum").
203. 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113
S. Ct. 2549 (1993); see supra notes 150-71 and accompanying text (discussing the McNary
decision).
204. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2574.
205. Id. at 2576.
206. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2574. Justice Blackmun explained that:
[t]he Refugee Act of 1980 explicitly amended [section 243(h)(1)] in three critical
respects. Congress (1) deleted the words "within the United States"; (2) barred
the Government from "return[ing]," as well as "deport[ing]," alien refugees; and
(3) made the prohibition against return mandatory, thereby eliminating the discretion of the Attorney General over such decisions.
Id. (alterations in original).
207. 357 U.S. 185 (1958), superseded by statute as stated in Amanullah v. Nelson, 811
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987); see supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text (discussing Leng May
Ma); supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's reliance on
Leng May Ma).
208. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2575. Justice Blackmun noted that the majority relied on a
negative inference in its conclusion that Congress removed the phrase "'within the United
States' " only with the intent to extend the protections of section 243(h)(1) to excludable
aliens. Id. Justice Blackmun noted that "nothing in Leng May Ma even remotely suggests
that the only persons not 'within the United States' are those involved in exclusion proceedings." Id.
209. Id.
210. Justice Blackmun pointed specifically to section 208(a), which applies to those
"'physically present in the United States, or at a land border or entry port.'" Id.; see
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988)).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 44:321

Blackmun argued, indicated that Congress did not intend a similar limita211
tion for section 243(h)(1).
IV.

EXTRATERRITORIAL PROTECTION FOR BONA FIDE REFUGEES
AFTER SALE V. HAITIAN CENTERS COUNCIL, INC.

In contradiction of the Protocol's humanitarian aims and without any
support from section 243(h)(1)'s legislative history, the United States
Supreme Court refused to grant section 243(h)(1) protection to Haitians
interdicted on the high seas.212 The Court ignored the explicit language
of the provision and the Protocol, and overturned the Second Circuit's
decision by utilizing a "patchwork" of inferences, presumptions, fragments of legislative and negotiating histories, and text from other
statutes.21 3
A.
1.

A Patchwork of Statutory Construction

The Formidable Hurdle of the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality

The Sale majority concluded that neither international nor United
States domestic law protects Haitians who are interdicted on the high
seas. 2 14 The Court reached this conclusion primarily by applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to section 243(h)(1) of the INA and to
Article 33 of the Protocol. 215 The Court, however, misapplied the pre-

sumption by inappropriately analogizing the Sale case to Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,216 and by failing to recognize
case law and public policy that support the extraterritorial application of
section 243(h)(1) to Haitians interdicted on the high seas.2 17
211. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2575.
212. Id. at 2567 (majority opinion).
213. See Respondent's Opposition for a Writ of Certiorari Brief at 24, Sale v. Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344) (arguing that the petitioners seek to
overturn the Second Circuit decision based on an elaborate "patchwork of inapposite presumptions, negative inferences, text from other statutory provisions, snippets of legislative
and negotiating histories, and their own reinterpreted litigation positions" to deny withholding of deportation protection to Haitian refugees).
214. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2567.
215. Id. at 2560. The majority explained that "the presumption that Acts of Congress
do not ordinarily apply outside our borders would support an interpretation of § 243(h) as
applying only within United States territory." Id.; see id. at 2565 (explaining that "a treaty
cannot impose uncontemplated extraterritorial obligations on those who ratify it through
no more than its general humanitarian intent").
216. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
217. See Brief for Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Benjamin R. Civiletti, and Griffin Bell,
Former Attorneys General of the United States of America, as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 15, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344)
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The Court should not have invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality2 18 because the application of section 243(h)(1) with respect to

Haitian repatriation does not threaten the jurisdiction of other coun-

tries.2 19 Sovereignties do not have the authority to apply their laws on
the high seas.2 2 ° In this case, Haitian repatriation occurs aboard United
States Coast Guard cutters on the high seas.22 ' Thus, when the Coast
Guard intercepts Haitians on the high seas, it does not contravene any
foreign nation's law.22 2 The Court's conclusion that INA provisions do
not apply extraterritorially unless they specifically provide for extraterritorial application renders President Bush's Kennebunkport Order, which

[hereinafter Brief for Katzenbach]. The Court's reliance on Argentine Republic is misplaced because Argentine Republic is distinguishable from the Sale case. Id. In Argentine
Republic, the Court applied the presumption against extraterritorial application to a tort
case that occurred "on the high seas some 5,000 miles off the nearest shores of the United
States." Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 440. Unlike Sale, however, the relevant statute in
Argentine Republic expressly limited its application to damage " 'occurring in the United
States.'" Id. at 439 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988)). In Argentine Republic, the
Court invoked the presumption against extraterritorial application "to reenforce the plain
language of the statute." Brief for Katzenbach, supra, at 15; see infra notes 214-36 and
accompanying text (discussing case law and public policy considerations that support the
extraterritorial application of section 243(h)(1)).
218. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's application of
the presumption against extraterritoriality); see also Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (holding that the presumption
"serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations
which could result in international discord"), superceded by statute as stated in Stender v.
Lucky Stores, 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949) (providing that the presumption against extraterritoriality is a "canon of construction ... whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained").
219. See Brief for Katzenbach, supra note 217, at 14-15. Granting Haitian boat people
protection under section 243(h)(1) does not violate the jurisdiction of other nations because on the high seas, there is no foreign law with which to interfere. Id.
220. Id.; see United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 1986) (explaining that "no nation may assert territorial jurisdiction" over the high seas); see also United
States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1960) (holding that modern nations agree that no
single nation controls the high seas); cf. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 78 (1941) (suggesting that a person on the high seas may be subject to the laws of a sovereign state).
221. See Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2553.
222. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 502(2) (1987) (explaining that "[t]he flag state may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe, to
adjudicate, and to enforce, with respect to the ship or any conduct that takes place on the
ship"); see Brief for Katzenbach, supra note 217, at 14-15 (explaining that the United
States Coast Guard does not interfere with foreign law aboard its cutters on the high seas).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 44:321

was authorized by section 212(f) of the INA,22 3 inapplicable outside of
United States borders.22 4
Additionally, the Supreme Court has allowed extraterritorial application of generally-worded statutes on a statute-by-statute basis.2 25 For example, the Court applies generally-worded United States antitrust
laws, 22 6 criminal statutes, 227 and patent laws extraterritorially. 228 In an

effort to satisfy their legislative purposes, 229 the Court applies these statutes outside of United States borders even though none of these laws
explicitly provide for extraterritorial application.23 ° Consequently, this
same principle applies to section 243(h)(1) because Congress deleted the
domestic restriction, "within the United States," and because the legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980 underscores the United States
commitment to refugees, regardless of nationality.23'
223. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (1988); see supra note 45 and accompanying text (providing the
text of the Kennebunkport Order). This section of the INA makes no express indication of
extraterritorial application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
224. Brief for Katzenbach, supra note 217, at 12. The Former Attorneys General explained that to presume the INA does not apply extraterritorially "in the absence of express language to that effect would make administration of the INA-including the
Executive actions in this very case-impossible." Id. They also noted that "[Ihike Section
1253(h), Section 212(f) refers simply to 'any aliens or ...any class of aliens,' making no
mention of geographical location." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)).
225. Id.
226. See Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970) (applying the Jones Act
extraterritorially).
227. See Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 617 (1927) (applying a tariff act
extraterritorially).
228. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952) (applying the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act extraterritorially).
229. See, e.g., Steele, 344 U.S. at 285 (applying the Lanham Act extraterritorially to
serve the legislative intent of the Act by protecting trade-mark registrants against unfair
competition).
230. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988); 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1988); Tariff Act of September 21, 1922, ch. 356, § 593(b), 42 Stat. 858, 982. The Jones Act provides that "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may... maintain an
action for damages at law" and makes no mention of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id. In
Hellenic Lines Ltd., the Court extended protection under the Jones Act to a seaman who
was injured on a Greek flag ship. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 398 U.S. at 306. In Steele, the Court
held a watchmaker in Mexico City, Mexico, liable for violating the Lanham Act. Steele,
344 U.S. at 280 (stating that the Lanham Act holds liable " '[a]ny person who shall, in
commerce,' infringe a registered trade-mark" (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a))); see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127. The Tariff Act provided that any person who knowingly or fraudulently imports
any merchandise into the United States contrary to law shall be fined or imprisoned. See
Tariff Act of September 21, 1922, § 593(b), 42 Stat. at 982; see also Ford, 273 U.S. at 624-25
(affirming the conviction of ship officers who violated the Tariff Act even though the Coast
Guard intercepted them on the high seas).
231. See 126 CONG. REc. 4499 (1980) (statement of Rep. Holtzman). Representative
Holtzman noted that the "new definition" of refugee under the Refugee Act of 1980 "eliminate[d] the geographical and ideological restrictions applicable to refugees [that were
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Furthermore, Congress could have expressly provided a geographical
restriction in section 243(h)(1), just as it did in two other important provisions that were amended by the Refugee Act.232 Section 208(a) provides
for asylum proceedings for aliens "physically present in the United States
or at a land border or port of entry. 23 3 Similarly, section 207 provides
for refugee processing overseas. 2 4 In contrast, Congress did not add a
territorial restriction to section 243(h)(1). 235 In fact, Congress deleted
the geographical limitation that was previously contained in section
236
243(h)(1) and did not substitute any other territorial restriction.
2. Peculiaritiesof the Court's Application of Leng May Ma
The Court inappropriately concluded that in amending section
243(h)(1), Congress intended to apply the provision to paroled aliens
such as those in Leng May Ma.237 The legislative history of the Refugee
Act of 1980 does not indicate that Congress intended to codify Leng May
Ma and extend section 243(h)(1) protection to parolees.2 38 If Congress

intended to extend section 243(h)(1) protection to parolees in exclusion
proceedings, it could have done so in a manner that would have been
substantially clearer than removing the phrase "'within the United
States' " from the text of the provision.2 39 For example, Congress could
characteristic of United States] law since 1952." Id.; see also 125 CONG. REC. 35,814 (1979)
(statement of Rep. Holtzman) (same); see supra note 21 and accompanying text (setting
forth the legislative purposes of the Refugee Act of 1980).
232. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549, 2575 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,432 (1987) (ruling that" 'where
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion' " (quoting Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23 (1983))).
233. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
234. Id. § 1157.
235. Id. § 1253(h)(1).
236. See id.; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text (describing the deletion of
the phrase "within the United States" from section 243(h)(1)).
237. See Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2575 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
relying on a case that the Court decided long before Congress enacted the 1980 amendment); see Respondents' Opposition for a Writ of Certiorari Brief at 24, Sale v. Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344).
238. See Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2575 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
relying on case law that Congress never mentioned in the legislative history of the amendment); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress Urging Affirmance at 25, Sale
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344) [hereinafter Brief of
Members of Congress] (explaining that "[tlhere is simply no mention of Leng May Ma
anywhere in the legislative record").
239. Brief for Members of Congress, supra note 238, at 26 (explaining that if Congress
solely intended to extend the availability of withholding of deportation to parolees in ex-
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have included exclusionary proceedings in the text or mentioned them in
240
the section's legislative history.
Even if Congress intended to extend section 243(h)(1) protection to
parolees like Leng May Ma, this protection would extend to interdicted
Haitians because United States intervention prevents their legal entry
into the United States. 24' The United States government takes custody of
interdicted Haitians, as it did with Leng May Ma, before the Haitians
gain legal entry into United States territory. 242 Thus, if the Court's construction of section 243(h)(1) is correct, interdicted Haitians would be
entitled to withholding of deportation proceedings.24 3
B.

Sacrificing Humanitarianismfor PoliticalExpediency: The
Inevitable Consequences of the Sale Decision

By promoting the United States disparate treatment of refugees on the
basis of their nationality, the Court's decision in Sale contravenes Congress' purpose for enacting the Refugee Act of 1980.244 Sale is a dangerous precedent for refugees throughout the world.2 45 The President and
Congress must clarify and delineate the boundaries of the United States
246
refugee policy to avoid discriminatory treatment of bona fide refugees
24 7
and to prevent abuse of United States refugee laws by nonrefugees.
clusion proceedings, "it could have achieved that result more easily and clearly than by
removing the former requirement that persons be 'within the United States' ").
240. Id.; Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2575 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that "nothing in
Leng May Ma even remotely suggests that the only persons not 'within the United States'
are those involved in exclusion proceedings").
241. See United States v. Kavazanjian, 623 F.2d 730, 736 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that
"'entry' is not accomplished until physical presence of an alien in this country is accompanied by freedom from official restraint"); see Brief of Members of Congress, supra note
238, at 26-27. Like Leng May Ma, interdicted Haitians on United States Coast Guard
cutters are under official restraint. Id.
242. Brief of Members of Congress, supra note 238, at 27.
243. Id.
244. See Cheryl Little, United States Haitian Policy: A History of Discrimination, 10
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 269, 289-94 (1993) (explaining the disparity of treatment between Cuban and Haitian refugees).
245. Telephone Interview with Demetrios Papademetriou, Director of the Immigration
Policy Program of the Carnagie Endowment for International Peace (Oct. 26, 1993) [hereinafter Papademetriou Interview]; see infra note 267 and accompanying text (explaining
that other countries waited for the outcome of the Sale case to redefine their own refugee
policies).
246. See 138 CONG. REC. S13,096 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1992) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
Senator Kennedy proposed "the International Refugee Protection Act, which would write
clearly into our immigration laws that the United States cannot return persecuted refugees,
regardless of where they come into U.S. custody." Id.
247. See Kirschten, supra note 4, at 1976 (reporting that the President wants to
strengthen border patrol, improve the State Department's screening ability, "and use anti-
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1. Disparate Treatment on the Basis of Nationality

Congress sought to eliminate the Attorney General's "ad hoc, discretionary, and discriminatory decision-making" method of administering
United States refugee law when it enacted the Refugee Act of 1980.248
Through this Act, Congress intended to eliminate "ideological, geographical or racial or ethnic biases" that permeated United States immigration
policy. 249 Congressional hearings and reports, which disclosed the mistreatment of Haitian asylum seekers, encouraged Congress to introduce
the statutory asylum provision into the Refugee Act.25 °
The Court's acquiescence in the President's unequal treatment of Haitians conflicts with Congress' intent in enacting the Refugee Act.25 1 The
legislative history of the Refugee Act discloses "that the executive's dis-

criminatory policies in dealing with Haitian refugees during the 1970's
constituted one of the motivating forces behind the Act., 252 The Kenracketeering laws to prosecute smugglers of aliens and subject those convicted to stiff
prison sentences and the confiscation of property").
248. Brief of Members of Congress, supra 238, at 20; see supra note 21 (explaining that
by enacting the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress intended to provide a nondiscriminatory
procedure for admitting refugees to the United States).
249. 126 CONG. REC. 4507 (1980) (statement of Rep. Chisholm). Representative
Chisholm commented that "[r]efugees fleeing persecution regardless of the country they
come from, on humanitarian considerations alone, should be equal in standing for entry
into the United States." Id. at 4507-08.
250. See id. at 4507-08; see also United States Refugee Programs: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (describing the discriminatory treatment of Haitians: "If you are a boat refugee from
Cuba, the INS automatically considers you a refugee. If you are a boat refugee from Baby
Doc's Haiti, the INS automatically considers you an illegal alien coming to the United
States for economic purposes.").
251. Brief of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Transafrica, and the Congressional Black Caucus as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
7-8, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs, Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344) [hereinafter
Brief of the NAACP].
252. Brief of Members of Congress, supra note 238, at 21; see 125 CONG. REC. 35,820
(1979) (statement of Rep. Chisholm). Representative Chisholm commented that:
While supporting H.R. 2816, I also wish to briefly address the tragic plight of
Haitian refugees. Since 1972, 8,000 to 10,000 black men, women, and children
have fled the oppressive Duvalier regime and sought political asylum in the
United States. Thousands have languished in South Florida for 5, 6, and up to 7
years, uncertain of their fate, and in desperate fear of forced return to Haiti....
The Haitian Government, the State Department, and INS would have us believe, these boat people are not political refugees, but rather flee to the United
States for economic reasons .... [TIhere can be no doubt that Haitians are in fact
political refugees.
Id. Prior to the 1980 amendment, the President retained absolute discretion to deport an
alien even if she qualifies under section 243(h)(1). Brief of Members of Congress, supra
note 238, at 24; John A. Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control,
36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 819, 848 (1982) (explaining that the executive's ideological considera-

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 44:321

nebunkport Order determines which migrants may enter the United
States based on foreign policy and ideological considerations, thus contradicting Congress' intent to eliminate ideological standards for United
25 3
States refugee policy.
The disparity between the INS' treatment of Haitian refugees and Cuban refugees is painfully obvious. 25 4 For the past two years, the United
States has hailed the Cuban refugees who found their way to Miami as
heroes and rewarded them by swiftly paroling them into the country.25 5
The United States does not treat the Haitians similarly.2 56 United Statestions led to the admission of refugees from communist countries-Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Soviet Union-and led to the denial of appeals by refugees "from brutal
regimes in the Philippines, Korea, Haiti, and Iran").
253. See Brief of American Jewish Committee, supra note 6, at 18. President Reagan's
Interdiction Program of 1981, the predecessor of the Kennebunkport Order, justified its
disparate treatment of Cubans and Haitians by asserting that a totalitarian and unfriendly
government forced Cubans into exile. Id. According to the 1981 program, Haitians, on the
other hand, chose to leave Haiti, whose comparatively friendly dictatorship wanted to cooperate with the United States in controlling illegal immigration. Id.
The Kennebunkport Order's policy promotes disparate results. Those who succeed in
entering the United States illegally are afforded the right to a determination of their refugee status; while those found on the high seas who have broken no United States laws are
turned back to possible persecution without a hearing. See id. at 18-19. This dichotomy
becomes even more suspicious when one considers that the Coast Guard, at the command
of the President, decides who may reach the United States borders to have her refugee
claim heard. See id.
254. The analysis of this Note was developed prior to President Clinton's change in
immigration policy in August 1994, which denies automatic asylum for Cuban migrants.
The detention and parole policies of the INS reveal the "great disparities in our treatment
of Cuban and Haitian refugees." Little, supra note 244, at 290. Although the rate of Cuban immigration into the United States is three times that of Haitian immigration, the INS
regularly paroles Cubans into the United States and frees them from detention, but does
not treat the Haitians similarly. Id. at 291. The INS authorizes Cubans to work and grants
them permanent resident status, whereas Haitians "are systematically detained and deported" and rarely granted work permits. Id.
255. Id. at 289-90. For example, in January 1993, 52 Cubans diverted a commuter flight
from Cuba to Miami. Id. at 289. The INS released all of the Cubans as parolees within 48
hours. Id. Even though more than 900,000 Cubans sought asylum in the United States, the
United States "never adopted a policy of interdiction, much less of unscreened returns."
Brief of American Jewish Committee, supra note 6, at 13. United States-Cuban immigration policy holds open the door for "potentially uncontrolled numbers of arrivals from
Cuba, who are now readily granted asylum and legal protection." Id.
256. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 513 (S.D. Fla. 1980),
modified, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982). In the 1970s, the INS in Florida instituted a special
"Haitian Program" to address a backlog of Haitians who sought political asylum after escaping the Duvalier dictatorship in Haiti. Id. at 512-13. The sole aim of the program was
to deport "Haitian asylum applicants as rapidly as possible." Id.; see also Little, supra note
244, at 292 (blaming Congress' enactment of the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966
for further intensifying this disparity in treatment).
It should be noted that under the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1988)), Congress provides

19941

Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.

Cuban immigration policy is "generous and humanitarian," whereas
25 7
United States-Haitian immigration policy is "stringent and inhumane.Nonetheless, the President's continued application of the Kennebunkport
Order creates "a two-track asylum program-one for Haitians and an-

other for non-Haitians.

' 258

Unlike Cuban and other non-Haitian immi-

gration programs, the current Haitian interdiction policy decisively denies
Haitian aliens the opportunity to apply for asylum.2 59 While the Coast
Guard summarily repatriates Haitian boat people to their persecutors, it

continues to rescue Cubans who flee their country on shoddy boats and
rafts for Florida.2 6 °
special treatment for Cubans: lawful, permanent residence within the United States. Id. at
1161. The President also provides special treatment for Haitians: automatic interception
and repatriation without regard to refugee claims. Brief of the NAACP, supra note 251, at
9. "Although the Order itself does not single out Haitians by name, [the INS] do[es] not
contest that it was expressly directed at the 'Haitian problem.'" Id. at 9 n.3; see Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1353 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that the day after
President Bush signed the Kennebunkport Order, the White House issued a press statement disclosing that the President " 'issued an executive order which will permit the U.S.
Coast Guard to begin returning Haitians picked up at sea directly to Haiti' "), rev'd sub
nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct, 2549 (1993).
257. Little, supra note 244, at 290. In 1966, Congress enacted the Cuban Adjustment
Act, which granted Cuban immigrants permanent resident status without completing the
same procedural steps that the United States required immigrants from other countries to
follow. Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(5), 1255 (1988)). The United States' policy of welcoming
Cubans who flee a communist country while simultaneously repelling Haitians who flee a
non-communist military dictatorship makes little sense in the post-cold war era. The
United States allows refugees from many other countries to enter the United States
" 'without the kind of hysteria, harassment, demagoguery and seeming racism that has
faced the Haitians.' " Joyce A. Hughes & Linda R. Crane, Haitians:Seeking Refuge in the
United States, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 747, 777 (1993) (quoting 139 CONG. REC. H4010 (June
23, 1993) (statement of Rep. Meek)).
258. Brief of the NAACP, supra note 251, at 8; see also Little, supra note 244, at 290-91
(explaining that refugee and asylum policies for non-Haitians include various procedural
and substantive protections).
259. See Brief of the NAACP, supra note 251, at 8 (asserting that "[ifu the alien is
Haitian ...

the process is very different").

260. See Brief of American Jewish Committee, supra note 6, at 17-19 (illustrating the
drastic difference in how the Coast Guard treats Haitian and Cuban boat people). In sharp
contrast to Haitians, most Cuban boat people receive legal status in the United States. Id.
at 18-19; see Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of Human Rights
Watch Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344). In-country processing of refugee claims in Haiti will
not ensure that repatriated Haitians will avoid persecution. Id. at 11. Although the United
States Consulate and the United States Embassy in Port-au-Prince processed refugee applications, many Haitians, given the slim possibility of gaining refugee status, chose not to
take the risk of being observed by Haitian government agents because the Consulate and
Embassy are located in exposed areas of Port-au-Prince in close proximity to Haitian government buildings. Id.
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The United States justifies its summary repatriation of Haitian refugees
by characterizing Haitians as purely economic refugees, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.26 1 Poverty is not the sole explanation
for the sudden flood of Haitian boat people.262 The surge in Haitian immigration that occurred immediately after the 1991 military coup, which
forced President Aristide into exile, suggests that reasons other than poverty motivated many of the refugees to make the treacherous journey to
263
the United States.

2.

The InternationalRamifications of Sale

The Sale Court utilized the same patchwork of statutory construction
to interpret the Protocol as it used to interpret the Refugee Act in denying humanitarian relief for refugees on the high seas. 264 To avoid the
mandates of Article 33 of the Protocol, the Supreme Court exploited
''gray areas of international law," thereby legitimizing the President's
program of interdiction and repatriation.2 6 5
As a result of the Sale decision, the United States has lost credibility in
reprimanding other governments for human rights violations.2 66 Other
countries attentively awaited the outcome of the Sale case so that they
261. Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugee, Racism, and Reparations:A Critiqueof the United
States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687, 704 (1993); see Connie Bruck,
Springing the Haitians, AM. LAW., Sept. 1982, at 35-39. Former INS General Counsel
Maurice Inman reflected the government's attitude when he stated that " 'one hundred
percent' [of Haitian refugees] came for economic reasons: 'They want material wealth,
whatever that may be to them-a house, a car, a pig.' " Id. at 39.
262. Lennox, supra note 261, at 705; see supra note 35 (setting forth noneconomic reasons for Haitians' fleeing Haiti after the military ousted President Aristide).
263. Lennox, supra note 261, at 705; see supra note 35. Some Members of Congress
recognized that most Haitians interdicted on the high seas feared political persecution and
deserved political asylum in the United States. Christine C. Lawrence, Committee Votes to
Suspend Repatriation of Haitians, 1992 CONG. Q. 414, 414 (1992). The House of Representatives passed a bill to suspend the Haitian repatriation program on February 27, 1992,
but the Senate took no action. 138 CONG. REC. H802-24 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1992).
264. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2558-67 (1993) (using the
uncommon definitions of return and refouler to interpret the text of Article 33 of the
Protocol and referring to negotiating histories that were never properly communicated to
signatories or ratifying bodies within the Convention); see supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text (criticizing the Court's reliance on negotiating histories).
265. See Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2568-69 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
departed from the ordinary meaning of the Protocol's language by ignoring its clear prohibition against returning a refugee to her homeland).
266. See The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 361
n.59 (1993) (explaining that the Haitian forced repatriation policy will likely "reverse the
trend toward recognition of a customary international law right of non-refoulement"); Interview with David Williams, Special Counsel for Immigration, United States Department
of Labor (Aug. 29, 1994) (explaining that the United States "does severe injustice to its
role as an international leader in human rights").

1994]

Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.

could align their own refugee policies with United States policy.267 Sale
teaches the global community that a country only needs to arrange bilateral agreements with oppressive governments 268 to avoid the nonrefoulement obligations of the Protocol.26 9
V.

CONCLUSION

Under section 243(h)(1) of the INA, the United States will not deport
aliens who are able to prove that they are bona fide refugees. Prior to
1980, section 243(h)(1) prohibited the deportation of refugees physically
and legally present within the United States. The Refugee Act of 1980
amended the INA to provide a comprehensive and uniform scheme for
those fleeing persecution. Congress amended section 243(h)(1) in 1980
by deleting the phrase "within the United States."
The Sale majority ruled that the United States need not consider claims
for asylum that are made by Haitian refugees whom the United States
has intercepted on the high seas. The holding in Sale legitimizes the
United States interdiction and repatriation of Haitian refugees, and illustrates the Court's refusal to challenge the legality of the highly volatile
issue of United States immigration policy. The Court's decision in Sale
will inevitably foster the continued discriminatory treatment of bona fide
Haitian refugees. Sale sets a frightening precedent for the world community. Congress and the President must reassert the United States commit267. Papademetriou Interview, supra note 245 (explaining that Australia was extremely
interested in the outcome of Sale because "this is something they want to do" to deal with
an influx of Southeast Asians who seek refuge in Australia); see The Supreme Court, 1992
Term-Leading Cases, supra note 266, at 361 (predicting that the Sale Court's decision
"may affect the development of international refugee law for years to come"); see also
Robert L. Newmark, Note, Non-Refoulement Run Afoul: The Questionable Legality of ExtraterritorialRepatriation Programs,71 WASH. U. L.Q. 833, 858 (1993) (explaining that the
Sale decision probably will have a profound effect on international refugee law because
other nations will likely turn to Sale "when political exigencies make it desirable for them
to do so"); Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344) (concluding that the Court's ruling will influence "the behavior of other countries and thus the fates of untold numbers of refugees throughout the
world").
268. Papademetriou Interview, supra note 245. Mr. Papademetriou explained that
countries have and will continue to offer economic or technical aid to oppressive governments as consideration for repatriation agreements. Id.; see supra note 32 (setting forth
the bilateral agreement between Haiti and the United States, which authorizes automatic
repatriation of Haitians interdicted on the high seas).
269. Papademetriou Interview, supra note 245. The Sale decision and the refugee policy it sanctions are indications that "the Western World [is willing to be] less and less mindful of the legal niceties of the Protocol." Id.
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ment to human rights by explicitly defining the boundaries of its refugee
policy.
Marta Luisa Sepalveda

